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Home Office Deductions: May a Taxpayer Have More Than
One Principal Place of Business?
Section 280A of the Internal Revenue Code I establishes the conditions under which taxpayers may deduct expenses incurred to
maintain offices in their homes. Congress enacted this provision to
enable taxpayers, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the courts
to distinguish objectively between deductible business expenses and
nondeductible personal living expenses, and to limit excessive deductions. 2 The section furthers these goals by generally prohibiting
1. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 95-455, § 601, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 280A). Section 280A provides in part:
(a) GENERAL RULE. - Except as otherwise provided in this section, in the case of a
taxpayer who is an individual or an electing small business corporation, no deduction
otherwise allowable under this chapter shall be allowed with respect to the use of a dwelling unit which is used by the taxpayer during the taxable year as a residence.
(b) EXCEPTION FOR INTEREST, TAXES, CASUALTY LOSSES, ETC. - Subsection (a)
shall not apply to any deduction allowable to the taxpayer without regard to its connection with his trade or business (or with his income-producing activity).
(c) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN BUSINESS OR RENTAL UsE; LIMITATION ON DEDUCTIONS FOR SUCH USE. (I) CERTAIN BUSINESS USE. - Subsection (a) shall not apply to any item to the
extent such item is allocable to a portion of the dwelling unit which is exclusively used
on a regular basis (A) as the taxpayer's principal place of business,
(B) as a place of business which is used by patients, clients, or customers in meeting
or dealing with the taxpayer in the normal course of his trade or business, or
(C) in the case of a separate structure which is not attached to the dwelling unit, in
connection with the taxpayer's trade or business.
In the case of an employee, the preceding sentence shall apply only if the exclusive use
referred to in the preceding sentence is for the convenience of his employer.

(5) LIMITATION ON DEDUCTIONS. -In the case ofa use described in paragraph (I)
. . . the deductions allowed under this chapter for the taxable year by reason of being
attributed to such use shall not exceed the excess of (A) the gross income derived from such use for the taxable year, over
(B) the deductions allocable to such use which are allowable under this chapter for
the taxable year whether or not such unit (or portion thereof) was so used.
This Note considers only the deduction authorized by§ 280A(c)(l)(A)- the "principal place
of business" exception.
2. See S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10, 147, reprinted in (1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 3439, 3446, 3579-80 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]; H.R. REP. No.
658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, 160, reprinted in (1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 2987,
2905, 3053-54. When Senator Long, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, introduced
this section on the floor of the Senate, he stated:
While in theory there is nothing wrong with appropriate deductions for business or investment expenses, in practice it is often extremely difficult to allocate between deductible
business expenses and nondeductible personal expenses. The result is that many people
are deducting excessive amounts, and the bill places strict limits on these deductions.
122 CONG. REc. 18,542 (1976).
Expenses incurred in a taxpayer's trade or business or in the production of income are
generally deductible. I.R.C. §§ 162, 212. However, "[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided
• . . no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses." I.R.C. § 262.
Congress allows taxpayers to deduct certain personal expenses for unexpected occurrences,
such as casualty losses, I.R.C. § 165(c)(3), and large medical bills, I.R.C. § 213, and for behav-
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deductions for trade or business expenses3 attributable to home offices, 4 and specifying a limited number of exceptions. One of those
exceptions authorizes home office deductions where the taxpayer
uses part of his home "exclusively . . . on a regular basis" as his
"principal place of business."5
Although the phrase "principal place of business" seems relatively straightforward, it has created interpretative difficulties. The
IRS defines "principal place of business" as the single location from
which the taxpayer conducts the bulk of his total business activity,
regardless of whether he engages in several separate businesses. 6 In
Curphey v. Commissioner ,1 the Tax Court rejected this approach in
favor of a broader definition. The taxpayer in Curphey managed
several condominiums in addition to working full time at a hospital
and deducted expenses attributable to a home office that he used exclusively on a regular basis to manage the condominiums. 8 The IRS
argued that Curphey could have only one principal place of business
ior that the legislature wishes to encourage, such as charitable contributions, I.R.C. § 170.
Congress also permits taxpayers to deduct certain state and local taxes, I.R.C. § 164. For a
general discussion of this area, see M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 140-53 (2d
ed. 1979).
3. Typically, these expenses include an allocable portion of the home depreciation, maintenance, utility, and insurance expenses. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 144, [1976) U.S.
CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 3577.
4. I.R.C. § 280A(a).
5. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(l)(A).
Section 280A also allows the home office deductions for two other types of offices: a place
of business normally used by "patients, clients, or customers," or a separate structure not attached to the dwelling unit. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(l). In each case, the home office must be "exclusively used on a regular basis" for business purposes. In the case of an employee, the home
office must be exclusively used "for the convenience of his employer." I.R.C. § 280A(c)(l).
Congress also limited the amount that a taxpayer could deduct. The taxpayer may deduct the
amount of gross income generated by the business use of the home less the amount of deductions otherwise allowed by the Code for the home, such as property taxes, I.R.C. § 164, and
mortgage interest payments, I.R.C. § 163. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(5). For the text of these provisions, see note 1 supra.
There are circumstances in which a taxpayer may choose not to take the home office deduction even if his expenses qualify under § 280A. That part of the home to which expenses are
allocated as a business office does not qualify for nomecognition of gain upon the sale of the
home. I.R.C. § 1034. Therefore, any gain realized for that portion of the house would have to
be currently recognized. See generally Priv. Ru!. 7950003, IRS LETTER RuL. (CCH) Book 7,
Fiche l; Lubell, The Home Office J)eduction: ls it Worth It?, 56 TAXES 528 (1978). Presumably the same is true for I.R.C. § 121, the one-time exclusion of gain from the sale of a principal
residence by an individual who has attained age 55.
6. See Curphey v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 766, 776 (1980); Proposed Treas, Reg. § l.280A2(b)(2) (Aug. 7, 1980) ("[A] taxpayer may have only one principal place of business regardless
of the number of business activities in which the taxpayer may be engaged."); Priv. Ru!.
8048014, [1980) IRS LETTER RUL. (CCH) Fiche 50; Priv. Ru!. 8048080, [1980) IRS LETTER
RUL. (CCH) Fiche 50; Priv. Rul. 8030025, [1980) IRS LETTER RUL. (CCH) Fiche 31; Priv, Ru!.
8030024, [1980) IRS LETTER RUL. (CCH) Fiche 31.
7. 73 T.C. 766 (1980).
8. 73 T.C. at 767-68. The Tax Court also determined that management of the rental property constituted a business under § 280A. 73 T.C. at 775.
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even if he engaged in more than one business. 9 The Service contended that the hospital was Curphey's principal place of business
because he spent more time and earned a greater portion of his income there. 10 The Tax Court, however, held that section 280A authorizes deductions for a home office that is the principal place of
any of a taxpayer's businesses. I I Because Curphey's home office was
the principal place of his rental business, section 280A would not
prevent him from deducting the expenses incurred to maintain that
office. The IRS does not acquiesce in the Tax Court's decision, and
has proposed regulations that adopt the overall business activity interpretation. I2
This Note argues that the Tax Court's more liberal interpretation
is correct because it more nearly reflects Congress's intent. Part I
seeks a basis for preferring one of the competing interpretations in
the text of section 280A and in the section's legislative history, but
finds none. Looking, of necessity, to the purposes that Congress
sought to advance with section 280A, Part II argues that those purposes do not demand a restrictive reading of "principal place of business." Such a reading, moreover, would undermine fundamental
and longstanding congressional tax policies. In the absence of a
more explicit statement of congressional intent, this policy analysis
provides a reasonable basis for rejecting the IRS's definition and for
concluding that home office expenses are deductible if the office in
question is the principal place of any of the taxpayer's businesses.

I
Although Congress excepted home offices that serve as a taxpayer's "principal place of business" from section 280A's general
rule of nondeductibility, it did not define this phrase when it enacted
the section. Because Congress apparently did not consider how this
provision would apply to taxpayers engaged in more than one busi9. 73 T.C. at 775-76.
10. 73 T.C. at 775-76.
11. 73 T.C. at 776-77.
12. Proposed Treas. Reg.§ l.280A-2(b)(2) (Aug. 7, 1980).
After these proposed regulations were announced, Congress forbade the IRS from using
public funds to enforce regulations that determine the taxpayer's principal place of business
under§ 280A. Appropriation - Fiscal Year 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-369, § 123, 94 Stat. 1351
(1980). Senator William L. Armstrong has since proposed S.31, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981),
which, in part, would clarify § 280A by explicitly allowing a deduction, subject to certain limitations, for the expenses incurred by a taxpayer in maintaining a home office which is the
principle place of any business, including a secondary business. In a letter to Senator Armstrong dated July 13, 1981, the Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy indicated that this amendment was unnecessary since the Treasury now intends to propose new regulations providing
for such a result See [1981) 9 FED. TAXES (P-H) f 55,421, at 55,236. At this writing, new
proposed regulations have not been issued.
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ness, 13 the statutory language does not indicate whether section 280A
refers to the principal place of all of a taxpayer's business activity or
to the principal place of any specific business. 14 Despite section
280A's lack of clarity on this point, the IRS argues that the statute's
language favors its approach. Specifically, the Service points out
that Congress authorized deductions for expenses incurred in maintaining a principal place of business rather than principal places .15
But "words importing the singular include and apply to several persons, parties, or things" in all acts of Congress, unless the context
otherwise requires. 16 The IRS argues further that because Congress
authorized deductions for three types of home offices, 17 it is an "obvious conclusion" that if the office is not the taxpayer's "principal
place of business," a deduction is allowable only if one of the other
provisions applies. 18 This argument, however, is at least as circular
as it is obvious. Both its premise and its conclusion assume that a
taxpayer may apply the exception only once, and the mere presence
of other exceptions does not justify that assumption.
The definitional problem is compounded by the fact that Congress has not used the phrase "principal place of business" in any
other section of the Code in a way that elucidates the meaning of
section 280A. Lacking explicit textual support for its position, the
13. The issue was raised in a letter to Congress, but apparently not acted upon. The writer
stated:
Let me also raise a third point which I believe should be clarified in the committee
report. Section 280(c)(l)(a) (sic) applies to the taxpayer's "principal place of business." It
is my assumption that this relates to the business whose income is being taxed and not to
the major source of income of the individual.
Tax Reform Act of197.5: Hearings on R.R. 10612 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3220 (1976) (letter from Roy Slade, director, Corcoran Gallery of Art).
Congress debated the Tax Reform Act on the following dates: Dec. 3 & 4, 1975, (considered in and passed by the House); June 16-18, 21-25, 28-30, July 1, 20-23, 26-30, Aug. 3-6, 1976
(House and Senate agreed to conference report that resolved amendments in disagreement).
See 121 CONG. REc. 35,458 (1975); 122 CONG. REc. 17,454 (1976).
14. See I.R.C. § 280A. Other sections of the Code that use the phrase "principal place of
business" refer to the headquarters or main office of a single corporation or tax preparation
business. See I.R.C. § 819A(b) (contiguous country branches of domestic life insurance companies); I.R.C. § 5113(b) (exemption of sales by liquor stores operated by states, political subdivisions, etc.); I.R.C. § 6038(a) (information with respect to certain foreign corporations);
I.R.C. § 609l(b) (place for filing returns or other documents); I.R.C. § 7407(a), (c) (action to
enjoin income tax preparers); I.R.C. § 7482(b) (courts of review; venue).
IS. See Priv. Rul. 8048080, (1980) IRS LE'ITER RUL. (CCH) Fiche 50; Priv. Rul. 8048014,
[1980) IRS LETIER RUL. (CCH) Fiche 50; Priv. Rul. 8030025, (1980) IRS LE'ITER RUL. (CCH)
Fiche 31; Priv. Rul. 8030024, (1980) IRS LETIER RuL. (CCH) Fiche 31.
16. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) (cross referenced from I.R.C. § 770l(d)(l)(/)). C:f. Treas. Reg.
§ l.368-2(h) (1960) ("As used in section 368, as well as in other provisions of the Internal

Revenue Code, if the context so requires . . . the singular includes the plural.").
17. See note 1 supra.
18. Brief for Respondent at 14-15, Curphey v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 766 (1980). Priv.
Rul. 8048080, [1980) IRS LETIER RuL. (CCH) Fiche 50; Priv. Rul. 8048014, (1980) IRS LETTER RUL. (CCH) Fiche 50; Priv. Rul. 8030025, (1980) IRS LE'ITER RuL. (CCH) Fiche 31; Priv.
Rul. 8030024, (1980] IRS LETIER RUL. (CCH) Fiche 31.
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IRS has relied by analogy on decisions interpreting section
162(a)(2), 19 which authorizes the deduction of "ordinary and necessary . . . traveling expenses . . . [incurred] while away from home in
the pursuit of a trade or business."20 The Service invokes this analogy because, for the purposes of section 162, a taxpayer's home "is
[usually] considered to be located at his principal or regular place of
business or employment."21 The IRS argues that the criteria used to
determine a taxpayer's tax home under section 162 should also be
used to designate his "principal place of business" under section
28OA.22 Implicit in these criteria is an assumption that a taxpayer
may have only one principal place of business and, therefore, only
one tax home,23 regardless of how many businesses he has. 24
There are several reasons why courts should not rely on cases
interpreting section 162(a)(2) to interpret section 28OA's "principal
place of business" requirement. First, the tax ''home" relevant to
section 162 includes the entire city or general area in which a business is located,25 while a taxpayer's "principal place of business"
under section 28OA is related to a specific situs or building.26 Second, these sections address different types of tax problems. Congress
adopted section 162(a)(2) to aid taxpayers whose businesses require
that they travel to another city and incur additional living expenses.27 Although these expenses generally would be classified as
19. 73 T.C. at 776.
20. I.R.C. § 162(a), 162(a)(2). Travel expenses generally include transportation expenses,
meals, and lodging.
21. Rev. Rul. 71-247, 1971-1 C.B. 54, 54. See Coombs v. Commissioner, 608 F.2d 1269,
1274 (9th Cir. 1979); Frank v. United States, 577 F.2d 93, 97 (9th Cir. 1978); Markey v. Commissioner, 490 F.2d 1249, 1253 (6th Cir. 1974); Daly v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 190, 195 (1979),
revd., 631 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1980). But see Six v. United States, 450 F.2d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 1971);
Burns v. Gray, 287 F.2d 698, 700 (6th Cir. 1961).
22. See Brief for Respondent at 11-14, Curphey v. Com.missioner, 73 T.C. 766 (1980). The
factors used to determine which area is the taxpayer's home under§ 162(a)(2) are (I) the total
time ordinarily spent in performing duties in each area; (2) the degree of the individual's
activity in each area, and (3) the relative significance of his financial return from each area.
See Markey v. Commissioner, 490 F.2d 1249, 1252 (6th Cir. 1974); IRS Publication No. 17 at
67, 1 IRS PUBLICATIONS (CCH) 501, 569 (1980).
23. See Markey v. Commissioner, 490 F.2d 1249 (6th Cir. 1978); Curphey v. Com.missioner, 73 T.C. 766 (1980); Montgomery v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 175 (1975), affd., 532 F.2d
1088 (6th Cir. 1976); Sherman v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 332 (1951).
24. See generally Benson v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 1555, 1557 (1968); Dorsky v.
Patterson, 59-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9135, at 71,189 (D. Alaska 1958); Stairwalt v. Com.missioner, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 902, 903 (1952); Sherman v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 332, 337 (1951).
25. See Curphey v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. at 776; IRS, DEPT OF THE TREAS., PUB. No.
463, TRAVEL, ENTERTAINMENT AND GIFT EXPENSES 2 (1980).
26. The taxpayer's home office is in his place of residence -

a particular building. The

Curphey court rejected the application of the § 162(a)(2) criteria for this reason. 73 T.C. at
776.
27. See Daly v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. at 195; Kroll v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 557, 562
(1968); Benson v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 1555, 1557 (1968).
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nondeductible personal expenses,28 Congress concluded that duplicative costs incurred to further a business should be deductible. 29
Section 280A, on the other hand, represents an attempt to distinguish
between business and personal expenses to prevent taxpayers from
deducting personal expenditures.30 Home office expenses are deductible because of their inherent business nature, rather than because these expenses duplicate costs otherwise incurred by the
taxpayer. The IRS's single principal place of business requirement
may be justified under section 162(a)(2) as a reasonable means to
determine whether the taxpayer has incurred duplicative expenses.
But section 280A has no duplication requirement, and the analogy
relied on by the IRS is, therefore, inapposite.
Part I thus finds no basis in section 280A's language, in explicit
congressional statements, or in analogies to other Code sections for
preferring either the IRS's "total business" interpretation or the Tax
Court's more liberal one. Part II looks for other evidence that may
illuminate Congress's intent.
II
To choose between the alternative constructions of "principal
place of business,'' courts should examine how each interpretation
comports with the purposes of section 280A, and adopt the one that
best satisfies congressional intent.31 Congress enacted section 280A
to "curb the widespread abuses" 32 associated with home office deductions - to prevent taxpayers from deducting predominantly personal expenses under the guise of business expenses.33 Although this
purpose would favor a restrictive reading of section 280A's exceptions, another fundamental tax policy - authorizing the deduction
of legitimate business expenses - also underlies the section. It is,
therefore, essential that courts strike a balance between these competing policies. Part II argues that only the Tax Court's interpretation guarantees the deductibility oflegitimate business expenses, and
that it does so without reducing the effectiveness of Congress's statutory abuse-prevention scheme.
Before Congress adopted section 280A, a taxpayer could deduct
the costs of maintaining an office in his home under either of the
28. See I.R.C. § 262; Treas. Reg. § I.262-l(b)(5) (1958) (household expenses are nondeductible); Treas. Reg.§ I.262-l(b)(5) (1958) (traveling expenses nondeductible unless specifically authorized).
29. James v. United States, 308 F.2d 204, 206-08 (9th Cir. 1962).
30. See text at note 2 supra.
31. See Stanley v. Commissioner, 338 F.2d 434,439 (9th Cir. 1964); Commissioner v. Kelley, 293 F.2d 904, 912 (5th Cir. 1961).
32. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 3, (1976) U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 3440.
33. See note 42 i'!fra and accompanying text.
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general business expense deduction provisions: section 162, which
allows "as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid
or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business,"34 or section 212, which permits taxpayers to deduct the "ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable
year ... for the production or collection of income."35 However,
the IRS and the courts did not always use the same standard to determine whether home office expenses were "ordinary and necessary."36 The Service challenged the deduction of expenses
associated with employees' home offices that were not required by
the employer as a "a condition of employment."37 Some courts used
a more liberal and subjective standard, requiring only that the office
be "appropriate and helpful" to the taxpayer's business.38 Under
this standard, courts allowed deductions to a teacher who used a portion of his home to prepare for class,39 and to a television advertising
executive who used his den exclusively to review his day's work and
to view television ads and programs.40 Congress decided to eliminate the home office deduction in such situations because it felt that
the office was primarily a personal convenience rather than a necessary element of the taxpayer's trade or business.41 The Senate Com34. I.R.C. § 162(a). See, e.g., Bodzin v. Commissioner, 509 F.2d 679 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
35. I.R.C. § 212. In adopting § 280A, Congress eliminl).ted the home office deduction for
§ 212 activities. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 149, [1976) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 3581.
36. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 144-45, 147, [1976) U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD.
NEWS at 3577, 3579, and cases cited therein.
31. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 144, [1976) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
3577. The IRS has consistently argued that an employee-taxpayer is entitled to a deduction for
home office expenses only when that office is a condition of employment. See Bodzin v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 820, 824-25 (1973), revd, 509 F.2d 679 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825
(1975); Gino v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 304, 314 (1973), revd, 538 F.2d 833 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976); O'Connell v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 837, 842 (1972);
Dietrich v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 685, 686 (1971); Rev. Rul 62-180, 1962-2 C.B. 52,
52-53.
38. E.g., Hall v. United States, 387 F. Supp. 612, 616 (D.N.H. 1975); Gillis v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 429, 432 (1973); Johnson v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 941,
943 (1972); Rafferty v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 848, 850 (1971); Bischoffv. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 538, 539 (1966). Other courts permitted these expenses to be deducted only when the home office was an implied condition of employment. This type of
situation arose when the taxpayer's office was either inadequate, see Peiss v. Commissioner, 40
T.C. 78, 83-84 (1963); Dietrich v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 685, 687 (1971), or not
available after working hours, see Kirby v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 431, 432-33
(1980).
39. E.g., Hall v. United States, 387 F. Supp. 612 (D.N.H. 1975); Dietrich v. Commissioner,
30 T.C.M. (CCH) 685 (1971); Peiss v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 78 (1963).
40. Newi v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 686 (1969), q(fd., 432 F.2d 998 (2d Cir.
1970).
41. See SENATE REPORT supra note 2, at 3, 9-10, 147-48, [1976) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 3440, 3446, 3579-80.
Some courts had previously disallowed deductions for home office expenses that seemed to
be primarily personal in nature. E.g., Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 515, 523 (1976), q(fd
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mittee Report indicates that Congress wished to prevent situations in
which "expenses otherwise considered nondeductible personal, living, and family expenses might be converted into deductible business
expenses simply because, under the facts of the particular case, it was
appropriate and helpful to perform some portion of the taxpayer's
business in his personal residence." 42
Congress sought to ensure the discreteness of personal and business expenses by replacing the subjective test used by courts interpreting section 162(a)43 with more objective and limiting
standards.44 To objectify the analysis further, the IRS has proposed
regulations that establish the criteria by which it wishes to determine
a taxpayer's overall principal place of business. The Service intends
to consider:
(i) the portion of the total income from business activities which is
attributable to activities at each location;
(ii) the amount of time spent in business activities in each location;
and
(iii) the facilities available to the taxpayer at each location. 45

These objective factors would provide courts with greater guidance
in determining the deductibility of home office expenses than does
the amorphous "appropriate and helpful" standard that some courts
have employed.46 But courts can apply these criteria to each of the
taxpayer's specific businesses as easily as to his overall business activity. The court could examine the taxpayer's businesses separately
and determine the principal location of each. Thus, the factors proposed by the IRS provide the same degree of objectivity whether the
court applies the Service's single principal place of business standard
per curiam, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979); Meehan v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 794, 808 (1976); Shepherd v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 219, 224
(1976); O'Connell v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 837, 843 (1972).
42. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 147, (1976] U.S. CODE CONO. & An. NEWS at 3580.
The Committee Report indicates that Congress was particularly concerned about employees who had an office supplied by their employer, but did some work at home because it was
more convenient. See id The Report cites Newi v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 686
(1969), '!!fd., 432 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1970), as an example of the sort of deduction that § 280A
was intended to disallow. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 145, (1976] U.S. CODE CONO, &
AD. NEWS at 3577. In that case, the taxpayer, a television network employee, worked during
the day in an office supplied by the network, and used a home office during the evenings to
review his day's work, view ads, and perform other tasks related to his job at the network. His
office at the network was always available to him, and he was not required to do any work at
home. See 28 T.C.M. (CCH) at 688. Congress concluded that, in such cases, the taxpayer
worked at home only for his personal convenience and should not be entitled to a deduction.
43. Prior to the adoption of § 280A, several courts determined the deductibility of home
office expenses by using an "appropriate and helpful" standard. See notes 38-42 supra and
accompanying text.
44. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 147, (1976] U.S. CODE CONO. & AD. NEWS at
3579. The Report indicates that the Committee believed there was "a great need for definitive
rules" in the area of home office deductions. Id
45. Proposed Treas. Reg.§ I.280A-2{b)(2) (Aug. 7, 1980).
46. See note 38 supra.
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or the more liberal standard announced by the Cuphey court. Since
both standards are equally objective, courts cannot select an interpretation of "principal place of business" on the basis of this factor. 47
Congress, however, sought not only an objective standard, but
also one that objectively prohibited the deduction of personal expenses. A standard may provide objective guidelines, yet nevertheless be inconsistent with Congress's intent, if it routinely allows
taxpayers to deduct personal expenses. Neither the IRS's interpretation of "principal place of business" nor that of the Cuphey court is
subject to this criticism.
Three requirements - principal place of business, exclusivity,
and regular use - together provide a sufficient guarantee that the
taxpayer has incurred expenses for a business purpose. In addition
to the "principal place of business" requirement, section 280A mandates that the home office be "exclusively used on a regular basis"
for business purposes.48 This means that the taxpayer must prove
that a specific part of his home is used "solely for the purpose of
carrying on his trade or business."49 Although the office need not be
47. In fact, on close examination the three factors proposed by the IRS appear better suited
to determining which office of a single business is its principal place of business than to deciding which of a taxpayer's businesses is his principal business. The Curphey court's interpretation avoids the need to make the very difficult and frequently subjective latter determination.
In this sense, the Tax Court's reading of "principal place of business" may provide greater
objectivity than the IRS's.
48. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(l).
49. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 148, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3581.
The "exclusive use" requirement does not apply to all of the provisions of§ 280A If the
taxpayer's home is the sole fixed location of his sales business, the inventory storage space need
not be exclusively used for business purposes. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(2); SENATE REPORT, supra
note 2, at 149, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3582. Exclusive use is also not required for a deduction if a taxpayer is providing day care services in the home. I.R.C.
§ 280A(c)(4). Congress added this exception in 1978 because such activity cannot realistically
be limited to one portion of the home yet "ordinarily result[s] in . . . incremental expenses
attributable to the residence beyond those which [would] have been incurred if the residence
had been used solely for personal purposes." S. REP. No. 66, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 91, reprinted
in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 185, 267.
A literal reading of the word "exclusively" may also create difficulties. If "exclusively" is
interpreted to mean exclusively as the principal place of the particular business, it would bar
deductions that should be allowed. For example, if a taxpayer had two businesses, each with
its only office in the same room in the taxpayer's home, he should clearly get a deduction for
home office expenses. However, the office would not be used exclusively as the principal place
of either business. Under the IRS's interpretation, the taxpayer would get a deduction because
the office would be his overall principal place of business, and used exclusively as such. A
similar situation would arise if the home office was the principal place of one of the taxpayer's
businesses, but was also used as a secondary location for a second business that had its principal place of business located elsewhere. Under this Note's analysis, the taxpayer should get a
deduc,tion because it is the principal place of one of the taxpayer's businesses. The taxpayer
should not lose the deduction merely because he does some other business work in the office.
And if the business with its principal office in the taxpayer's home is his primary business, he
would be allowed a deduction under the IRS's interpretation as well.
Under both the IRS's and the Curphey court's interpretations, the taxpayer should get a
deduction in these situations because he has incurred legitimate business expenses. But there
may nevertheless be some question as to whether the Curphey court's separate business inter-
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in a separate room, it must be physically segregated from space used
for personal purposes50 to eliminate the administrative problem of
verifying the taxpayer's allocation of expenses attributable to the
various uses.51 Congress imposed the "regular use" requirement to
ensure that the taxpayer actually worked in the home office, and to
prohibit deductions for a room that is used to conduct business only
"incidental[ly] or occasional[ly]."52 Under either interpretation of
"principal place of business," the bulk of the taxpayer's work and
income, at least for one business, must be generated through the
home office.53 Although the Curphey court's "specific business" interpretation permits a deduction for home offices that may generate
a smaller percentage of the taxpayer's total income, the business nature of the office itself remains unchanged. The office must be the
headquarters for activities that qualify as a "trade or business" even
under this more liberal interpretation of "principal place of business."54 The limitations that Congress built into section 280A are
thus sufficient to ensure that taxpayers may deduct only business expenses, regardless of whether "principal place of business" is read
expansively or narrowly.
This conclusion is reflected in the Tax Court's decision in
Curphey. Dr. Curphey claimed a deduction for a home office that
pretation would authorize these deductions. All doubt could be removed by interpreting "exclusively'' to mean exclusively for a business purpose. This would ensure that the expenses
incurred to maintain the home office in the situations described above would be deductible. It
is also consistent with Congress's goals as described in the Committee Reports, which emphasized Congress's reluctance to allow personal expenses to be transformed into business expenses. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
50. See Gomez v. Commissioner, [1981) 9 FED. TAXES (P-H) ~ 57,543 (T.C.M. Dec, 18,
1980).
51. This allocation involved several approximations and was not always calculated consistently. For example, some courts allocated expenses based on the ratio of time used for business purposes over total time used, while the IRS compared the business use to the total time
that the room was available for any use. Compare Gino v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 304, 314
(1973), with Rev. RuL 62-180, 1962-2 C.B. 52, 54. Courts must also calculate the amount of
space in the home used for business purposes. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 146-47,
[1976) U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 3579.
52. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 148, [1976) U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 3581.
One court has stated in dictum that "intermittent" use does not meet the "regular basis" test.
Borom v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (P-H) ~ 80,459, at 1997-98 (1980) (dictum).
53. The criteria evolved by the IRS for determining a taxpayer's principal place of business
require a determination of ''the amount of time spent in business activities" and "the portion
of the total income from business activities" generated at each of the taxpayer's business locations. Proposed Treas. Reg.§ l.280A-2(b)(2) (Aug. 7, 1980). This test can be used to determine the principal place of either a specific business or the taxpayer's total business activity.
54. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 149, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
3581.
For activity to qualify as a trade or business under I.R.C. § 162, it must consist of more
than isolated transactions; courts require continuing, regularized activity, though it need not be
the taxpayer's primacy business. See, e.g., Ehrman v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 607, 610 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 668 (1941); Atkins v. United States, 14 F. Supp. 288, 290..91 (Ct, Cl.
1936).
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was the principal place of his rental business. The rental business,
however, was a secondary business for Curphey, since it produced
less income and required less time than his medical career, which
was located principally at a nearby hospital. 55 Nevertheless, the Tax
Court allowed Curphey a deduction for his home office expenses. 56
It first established that, absent the home office question, expenses attributable to a secondary business are deductible as ordinary and
necessary business expenses. 57 The court found no indication that
Congress intended to distinguish between primary and secondary
businesses when it enacted section 280A, and decided that the section was less restrictive of legitimate business expense deductions
than the IRS's overall principal place of business test.58 According
to the court, its more liberal interpretation of section 280A would
"fulfill the legislative objective of preventing deductions for the use
of a home for reasons which are primarily personal" without excluding any otherwise legitimate home office deductions. 59 The court
therefore held that a taxpayer can deduct the expenses incurred in
maintaining a home office as the principal place of his second business.
Because Congress's desire for an objective standard that prohibits the deduction of purely personal expenses provides no clear basis
for choosing between the alternative interpretations, we must tum to
the second major policy goal - ensuring the deductibility of legitimate business expenses. Congress does not allow individuals to deduct personal expenses60 because these expenditures reflect the
disposition that taxpayers elect to make of the net income that they
have previously eamed. 61 Business expenditures, on the other hand,
must be deducted to calculate the taxpayer's net income62 - total
earnings less the expenses and losses incurred in producing those
55. 73 T.C. 766, 767-68 (1980).
56. 73 T.C. at 776.
57. 73 T.C. at 775-76.
58. 73 T.C. at 776-77.
59. 73 T.C. at 776-77.
60. See I.RC. § 262.
61. See James v. United States, 308 F.2d 204, 206 (9th Cir. 1962) (footnote omitted) ("[The
Internal Revenue Code] reflects a purpose to tax income spent by individuals for their ordinary costs of living."); M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 2, at 86-87, 140. See generally Andrews,
.Personal .Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REv. 309, 313 (1972); Kelman,
.Personal .Deductions Revisited· Wlzy They Fit .Poorly in an "Ideal" Income Tax and Wlzy They
Fit Worse in a Farfrom Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831, 833 (1979); Pechman, Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Comment, 81 HARv. L. REv. 63, 64 (1967); Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Titan an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081, 1083-84 (1980).
62. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 691 (1965); Commissioner v. Sullivan,
356 U.S. 27, 29 (1958); McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1944) (Black, J., dissenting);
ANDERSON, TAXATION AND THE AMERICAN EcONOMY 196 (1951).
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earnings. 63 Congress taxes net, rather than gross, income because it
has concluded that net income is a better measure of an individual's
ability to pay taxes. 64 Business expense deductions may also stimulate business growth and increase employment opportunities.65 Because an individual pays no tax on his business expenses, he has
more capital available to reinvest in his business or to spend on consumer goods. This additional capital may produce greater business
income, which in tum generates additional tax revenues. 66
It is on this ground that courts can distinguish between the IRS's
"overall business" and the Tax Court's "specific business" interpretations of "principal place of business." Since the deductions allowed under either construction are legitimate business expenses,
and not personal expenses,67 Congress's intent is best satisfied by the
standard that allows the greater number of legitimate business expenses to be deducted. By interpreting section 280A liberally, courts
will further Congress's desire to tax only net income, to stimulate
economic growth, and to increase employment opportunities.68 The
IRS, which allows taxpayers to deduct the office expenses associated
with a second business not located in the home, 69 refuses to allow a
taxpayer to deduct the expenses of maintaining a room in his home
as the principal office of his second business. 70 This policy makes an
entire class of business expenses nondeductible, and frustrates congressional intent. The Curphey court's analysis, on the other hand,
allows this group of business expenses to be deducted. Because the
Curphey court's approach permits a greater number of legitimate
business expenses to be deducted without contravening section
280A's other goals, courts and the IRS should adopt its conclusion
that section 280A authorizes deductions for expenses incurred to
63. See, e.g., Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 33 (1958); Higgins v.
Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 477 (1940).
64. See M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 2, at 86; W. GREEN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
MODERN TAXATION 71-72 (2d ed. 1938). q: w. ANDERSON, supra note 62, at 316 (discussing
state gross income taxes on businesses).
65. See W. ANDERSON,supra note 62, at 311, 510-11; THE COMMITTEE ON POSTWAR TAX
POLICY, A TAX PROGRAM FOR A SOLVENT AMERICA 16, 58, 82 (1945); W. RABY, THE INCOME
TAX AND BUSINESS DECISIONS 42 (1964); THE RESEARCH AND POLICY COMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, TAXES AND THE BUDGET 11, 13 (1947); THE RESEARCH COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, A POSTWAR FEDERAL TAX PLAN FOR HIGH EMPLOYMENT 7 (1944); Carpenter, Growth and Federal Income
Taxes, 37 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 94, 99, 112-13 (1962).
66. See S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 25, (1962) U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS
3304, 3304, 3327.

61. See notes 47-54 supra and accompanying text.
68. See notes 62-66 supra and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., Fackler v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d.509, 511-12 (6th Cir. 1943), Curphey v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 766, 776 (1980); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-6 (1960).
70. See note 6 supra.
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maintain home offices that are the principal place of any of the taxpayer's businesses.
CONCLUSION

Section 280A limits the availability of home office deductions.
Congress now permits taxpayers to deduct these expenses in only a
few specified cases, such as when the home office is the taxpayer's
"principal place of business." In the case of a taxpayer with more
than one business, the IRS has interpreted this provision to allow a
deduction only when the home office is the principal place of the
taxpayer's overall business activity. But the Tax Court recently held
that the deduction was available for the principal place of any of the
taxpayer's businesses.
This Note advocates the Tax Court's approach, and has demonstrated that this interpretation better satisfies the congressional policies that underlie section 280A - allowing taxpayers to deduct
legitimate business expenses and prohibiting the deduction of personal expenses. The IRS and the courts should adopt this interpretation because it allows taxpayers to deduct more of the costs
associated with maintaining business offices, while providing adequate guarantees that the personal expenses of maintaining a home
will not be deducted under the guise of business expenses.

